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ESSAYS

THE ETHICS OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
William H. Simon*
A large literature has emerged in recent years challenging the standard conception of adversary advocacy that justifies the lawyer in doing anything arguably legal to advance the client's ends. This
literature has proposed variations on an ethic that would increase the
lawyer's responsibilities to third parties, the public, and substantive
ideals of legal merit and justice.
With striking consistency, this literature exempts criminal defense
from its critique and concedes that the standard adversary ethic may
be viable there.' This paper criticizes that concession. I argue that the
reasons most commonly given to distinguish the criminal from the
civil do not warrant a more adversarial ethic in criminal defense.
However, I also suggest that another, less often asserted argument
might provide a more plausible ethical basis for aggressive criminal
defense. A truly plausible case, however, would require substantial
modifications of both the argument and the practices associated with
that defense.
INTRODUCTION

At the outset, we should focus the inquiry. I take it for granted
that lawyers can appropriately plead not guilty on behalf of clients
they in fact believe to be guilty and defend these clients in a variety of
ways. One reason, of course, is that, where the client denies guilt, it is
more desirable to have disputed questions of guilt determined by the
court at trial than by the lawyer unilaterally and in private. Thus, the
lawyer can contribute more by assisting the trier of fact in making the
determination than by making it herself. In addition, the law explic* Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. 1969, Princeton; J.D. 1974, Harvard. - Ed.
I am grateful for advice and help from many, including Joe Bankman, Dan Barton, Robert Post,
Deborah Rhode, Steve Schiffrin, Bob Weisberg, Bob Gordon, Guyora Binder, and participants in
seminars at the American, Cornell, Northeastern, and Stanford law schools. I am distinctively
indebted to Barbara Babcock and Tom Nolan, two great defense lawyers who - in the best spirit
of the adversary system - improved the article by arguing vigorously against its conclusions.
1. See, eg., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58-66 (1988);
Deborah L. Rhode, EthicalPerspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605 (1985);
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1, 12 (1975).
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itly gives many rights to criminal defendants based on values independent of guilt or innocence; these "intrinsic procedural rights"
include the right of a defendant who concedes guilt privately to plead
not guilty and put the prosecution to its proof, the right to exclude
unlawfully obtained evidence, and the right not to be subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment.
The issues with which we are concerned involve tactics that cannot
plausibly be viewed either as assisting the trier in making an informed
determination or as vindicating specific intrinsic procedural rights. It
will be convenient to focus on tactics over which lawyers have some
discretion in the sense that the tactics are neither clearly, at least effectively, prohibited nor clearly required by norms of effective assistance
of counsel. For example:
" Defense lawyers sometimes have opportunities to draw out and delay cases, for instance, by deliberately arranging their schedules to
require repeated continuances. This can have the advantage of exhausting prosecution witnesses and eroding their memories. 2
" Defense lawyers are sometimes asked to present perjured testimony
by defendants. They sometimes find they can benefit their clients by
impeaching the testimony of prosecution witnesses they know to be
truthful. And they sometimes can gain advantage by arguing to the
jury that the evidence supports factual inferences they know to be
untrue. For example:
My client Norman, and his co-respondent, Steve Thomas, were
charged with receiving stolen property. The police happened upon Norman and Steve in an alley transferring a stereo and TV from a junked car
into the back seat of a white Pontiac.
The case hinged on whether our clients knew (or should have known)
that the property was stolen....
When Norman borrowed his cousin's Pontiac, he told us, he was
given only the ignition key, not the trunk key. But when all the evidence
was in, no mention had been made of that fact. At Steve Thomas's lawyer's suggestion, we made what was to me, at that time, a novel and
shocking argument: obviously Steve and Norman had no idea that the
property was stolen, else why would they have been loading it into the
Pontiac's back seat, instead of concealing it in the trunk?3
2. According to one Manhattan assistant district attorney, "[B]y and large defense lawyers
here play a game. It's called delay. The more you delay your cases, the weaker they get for the
prosecution." Steven Brill, Fighting Crime in a CrumblingSystem, AM. LAW, July-Aug. 1989, at

3, 122.
3. JAMES S. KUNEN, "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?": THE MAKING OF A
CRIMINAL LAWYER 117 (1983). Most defense lawyers seem to regard this type of argument as
legitimate. By contrast, the propriety of presenting client perjury and impeaching truthful witnesses is controversial. Compare MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 43-58 (1975) (defending these practices) with Harry I. Subin, The Criminal
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Lawyers occasionally find it advantageous to disclose or threaten to
disclose information that they know does not contribute to informed
determination on the merits because such disclosure injures the
prosecution or witnesses. Take the practice of "greymail" as pioneered in the perjury defenses of various government officials, such
as CIA director Richard Helms, who lied to Congress about the
agency's involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende. The
defense demands disclosure of information that would be damaging,
or at least embarrassing, to the government solely to pressure it to
drop the prosecution.4 Or consider the practice of bringing out embarrassing but irrelevant information about adverse witnesses. Assume, for example, that the defense lawyer threatens to crossexamine the complaining witness in a rape case on her prior sexual
history, even though the defendant does not contend that she
consented. 5
I call the policy of engaging in such practices whenever they are
advantageous to the client aggressive defense. The central question
here is whether there is any feature distinctive to the criminal sphere
that would lead one who disapproved of aggressive defense (and its
plaintiff-side analog) in the civil sphere to approve of it in criminal
defense.
Before discussing the distinctive features, we should consider
two objections that, if conceded, would moot further discussion.
The first objection points out that, in each of the situations mentioned above, the ethically questionable tactic is permissible only because the judge allows it. The judge grants the motions for
continuance, overrules the objections to the misleading examination
or argument, and grants the requests for the irrelevant information.
The second objection challenges the premise that the defense lawyer
ever knows anything with sufficient certainty to create the supposed
tension between truth and advocacy. Even the client's own inculpatory statements may be the product of confusion or psychopathology. It is the trier's job, not the lawyer's, to make difficult factual
determinations, this objection asserts. Thus, both objections contend that, because there is another actor - the judge or jury - that
is better positioned to take account of any interests threatened by
Lawyer's "Different Mission'" Reflections on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHCS 125 (1987) (criticizing them).
4. See Joe Trento, Inside the Helms File, NATL. L.J., Dec. 22, 1980, at 1.
5. See Subin, supranote 3, at 129-36 (discussing the use of a rape victim's past sexual history
to illustrate the problem of truth subversion).
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the lawyer's tactic, the defense lawyer should be excused from concern with them.
The problem with this contention is that the notion that the
judge or jury adequately safeguards the competing interests is plausible only to the extent that the judge or jury has all the relevant
information. The ethical tension in these situations arises because
the lawyer typically has information, relevant to whether the tactic
is justifiable that she withholds from the trier. She knows that the
purpose of her motion for continuance is delay, or that the testimony of the prosecution witness is accurate, or that the requested
discovery material will not be relevant to the defense.
To conclude that she "knows" these things, we do not have to
attribute any cosmic, pre-Heisenbergian certainty to her; we just
have to conclude that, given her knowledge and the fact that she
does not fully share it with the trier, she is in a better position than
the trier to make the relevant judgment. If the client has told her,
credibly but confidentially, that he was at the scene of the crime,
then the defense lawyer is better able than the trier to decide
whether the information that the prosecution witness, who will
place him there, has impaired vision or a prior perjury conviction
will contribute to a determination on the merits.
Nevertheless, the objections do point toward two important considerations. First, the kind of ethical dilemmas at issue here presuppose some relative disability on the part of the surrounding roles,
especially the trier, to take account of the interests threatened by the
tactics. Lack of information is perhaps the most salient such disability (though there are others - for example, incompetence or corruption on the part of the trier). When the surrounding role players
have all the information available to the defense lawyer and there
are no other procedural deficiencies, it is plausible for the lawyer to
defer concern with nonlient interests to the other role players.
Second, any factual judgments on which the defense lawyer bases decisions about aggressive defense tactics should take account of
the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The criminal process is committed to resolving
factual ambiguity in favor of the defendant. This is one distinction
between the civil and criminal processes that does have general significance for ethical decisionmaking. It means that the defense lawyer cannot "know" the facts adverse to her client until she is
convinced of them to a higher degree of confidence (beyond a reasonable doubt) than would be required in a civil case.

CriminalDefense
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DUBIOUS ARGUMENTS FOR AGGRESSIVE DEFENSE

A.

The Bogey of the State

Libertarians claim that aggressive advocacy is distinctively appropriate to the criminal sphere because it serves to check oppression by
the "state." Such arguments invoke the image of the "isolated,"
"lone," "friendless," or "naked" individual faced with the "enormous
power and resources of the state." Aggressive defense is supposed to
level the playing field and turn the trial into a "contest of equals," or
at least express the system's commitment to treat all citizens with
6
respect.
Aggressive defense is also supposed to protect against the abuse of
state power. The danger of abuse is most commonly attributed to the
inherently corrupting nature of state power and the consequent aggression and rapacity of state officials. The aggressive defense lawyer
inhibits such abuse by increasing the difficulty of conviction. In David
Luban's rhetoric:
We want to handicap the state in its power even legitimately to punish us, for we believe as a matter of political theory and historical experience that if the state is not handicapped or restrained ex ante, our
political and civil liberties are jeopardized. Power-holders are inevitably
tempted to abuse the criminal justice system to persecute political opponents, and overzealous police7 will trample civil liberties in the name of
crime prevention and order.
This type of rhetoric has been exempt from critical reflection for so
long that even a small amount should raise doubts. In the first place,
the image of the lonely individual facing Leviathan is misleading. Let
us grant the lonely part even though some defendants have lots of
friends. But, what about the state? Libertarian rhetoric tends to suggest that the individual defendant takes on the entire state. But, of
course, the state has other concerns besides this defendant. From the
state's point of view, the defendant may be part of an enormous class
of criminal defendants and suspects with which it can hardly begin to
cope.
It is more plausible to portray the typical defendant as facing a
small number of harassed, overworked bureaucrats. Of course, state
agencies can focus their resources on particular defendants and, when
they do so, their power can be formidable. But the state cannot possibly focus its power this way on all defendants or even most of them.
6. See, e-g., CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND
SOCIAL CHOICE 128-32 (1970); LUBAN, supra note 1, at 58-66; Barbara A. Babcock, Defending
the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. R.V. 175 (1983-1984).
7. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 60.
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Yet, aggressive defense treats all defendants as if they faced the full
concentrated power of the state.
Second, victims do not appear in the libertarian picture. Criminal
actions are styled as claims by the state for punitive remedies. But in
fact prosecutors often initiate such actions on behalf of particular individuals whose rights the defendant has violated and who have a strong
personal stake in the outcome - not necessarily a claim for tangible
compensation (although some criminal proceedings do involve restitutionary remedies), but a desire for vindication, retribution, or protection that the defendant's punishment might afford them.
The "victims' rights" movement has worked for the past two decades to replace in the popular consciousness the defense lawyer's image of the criminal trial as a state-versus-defendant contest with that
of a victim-versus-defendant contest. The movement is often naive,
even blind, about the efficacy of criminal punishment in deterring future wrongs or aiding victims, but its imagery seems as plausible as
that of the defense lawyer.
Now consider the suggestion that it is desirable to equalize the
abilities of prosecution and defense to level the playing field. If we
really wanted to do this, we could "handicap" '8 state officials, to use
Luban's word, the way we handicap horses in thoroughbred races by requiring the stronger ones to carry weights. It would certainly
slow down prosecutors and police if they had to carry around belts
with, say, forty pounds of lead weights. If we wanted to pursue equality, we would have to increase the weights in proportion to the
probability of conviction. The prosecutor of a defendant caught redhanded before a crowd of witnesses might have to drag around a ball
and chain of several hundred pounds.
The reason why this sounds silly is that the premise that there is
any interest in categorically remedying imbalances of power between
prosecution and defense is silly. We want the prosecution to be strong
in its ability to convict the guilty but weak in its ability to convict the
innocent. Where these goals are in conflict, we make tradeoffs, more
often than not in favor of the latter. But an indiscriminate weakening
of state power, unfocused on any of the goals of the process, serves no
purpose at all. The problem with aggressive defense is that it impedes
the state's ability to convict the guilty without affording any significant
protection to the innocent.
The state-focused arguments for aggressive defense are driven by
what might be called the libertarian dogma. The right-wing version of
8. Id.
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the libertarian dogma is that the only important threat to liberty is the
state. The left-wing version is that the only important threats are the
state and powerful private organizations like business corporations. In
the latter view, as Luban puts it, the central rule of the advocate is
"the protection of individuals against institutions." 9 The idea that informal, diffuse violence or oppression might threaten liberty is foreign
to both versions of the dogma.
The libertarian dogma usually refers to totalitarian regimes like
Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia and the absence of criminal defense
rights in such regimes. 10 These examples are supposed to illustrate the
danger to liberty of the overpowerful state and the value of criminal
defense in checking that danger. The point has merit, but it is incomplete. It ignores the dangers to liberty of the weak state. Both Nazi
Germany and Soviet Russia emerged from weak states (the Weimar
Republic and the Provisional Government), in part as a consequence
of the illegal private terrorism and paramilitary aggression these states
were unable to check. Since the end of colonialism, Latin America has
seen many examples of weak states powerless to check the oppression
of the paramilitary forces of landowners or narcotics traffickers.
Moreover, as an argument for defendants' rights in the criminal
process, the libertarian dogma ignores that criminal law enforcement
represents not only a danger that state power will be abused, but also
an important safeguard against such abuse. The inability of certain
weak Latin American states to prosecute effectively the crimes of their
military officers tragically illustrates this. In the United States the
sudden conversion of Oliver North's friends to criminal defense partisans struck many liberals as a satisfying irony, but now that the Fifth
Amendment has thwarted his prosecution for one of the most egregious abuses of state power in recent years, liberals should qualify
their claims about its role as a safeguard of liberty.
The left-wing version of the libertarian dogma at least recognizes
the potential threat to liberty of private organizations like the Nazi
party under the Weimar Republic or the Mafia in Italy. But it too
makes arbitrary distinctions. Consider Luban's effort to update the
dogma to fit the changing fashions of liberal discourse. In the 1960s
some liberals had difficulty acknowledging any social interest in the
enforcement of the criminal law. Since then feminists have helped
them to see the social interest in enforcing at least one set of prohibitions - those against rape and sexual battery. This insight might
9. David Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A
Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1028 (1990).
10. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 2.
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seem hard to square with the libertarian dogma, since rapists and batterers are not typically agents of the state or organizations. But in his
argument for restraint in cross-examining complainants in rape cases,
Luban solves the problem by asserting that such cases do in fact pit
the state against another menacing institution - "patriarchy." 11
This tactic proves too much. Since all behavior is situated in and
influenced by social structures and processes, you can reify almost any
act into an institutional one. Imagine prosecutors urging moderation
in the defense of a drug prosecution on the ground that the state is
confronting the institution of the Drug Culture; or in the defense of a
mugging prosecution on the ground that the state is pitted against the
Underclass; or in the defense of a small-time con artist on the ground
that the defendant represents Capitalism.
Carried far enough, the tactic would lead to the insight that formal
institutions are not the only important threats to liberty, that a wide
and unspecifiable variety of social processes that are experienced as
diffuse violence can threaten liberty as well. But the whole point of
the tactic is to deny this insight, to make rape look exceptional and
distinctively statelike in order to acknowledge the liberty interests in
its effective prohibition without conceding the point for a broad range
of criminal prosecutions.
Luban's argument that aggressive defense desirably "overprotects" 12 liberty against its abuse by the state raises the question of why
overprotection against state abuse is worth the resulting underprotection against private abuse. To the extent one can discern an answer, it
is the customary libertarian claim - typically unaccompanied by
political or historical analysis - that the dangers of totalitarianism are
greater than the dangers of anarchy.
If we put aside the problem, noted above, that these dangers are
not entirely distinct, there is a further objection to this argument. The
argument assumes that we must choose categorically between a criminal justice system that protects against one danger or a system that
protects against another. But, in fact, the relevant choices are at the
margin. We can all agree on a system that provides strong opportunities to establish innocence and to assert some intrinsic procedural
rights. The question then becomes whether any net benefits are
achieved by the addition of a categorically adversarial defense that includes, for example, active deception.
Although the image of the powerful, rapacious state is the most
11. Luban, supra note 9, at 1028.
12. LUBAN, supra note 1, at 60.
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prominent one in the rhetoric of criminal defense, one occasionally
finds aggressive defense rationalized with an image of a weak, bumbling state. In this image, the problem is not the bad faith of public
officials, but their sloth and ineptitude. Aggressive defense works to
keep them on their toes and enforce higher standards of practice.
In working this rhetorical vein, John Kaplan refers to a prosecution in Los Angeles of a celebrity for soliciting prostitution in a police
decoy operation. As executed prior to this case, the operation involved a microphone in the decoy's purse that transmitted to officers
hiding nearby but did not tape record the soliciting statements. Defense counsel won an acquittal by emphasizing how easily the police
could have obtained more reliable evidence on tape and proceeding to
cast doubt on the officers' "uncorroborated" evidence. As a consequence of this case, the police improved their practice by routinely
13
taping the soliciting statements.
The idea here is that the defense of the guilty helps the innocent by
raising the standards of police and prosecutorial practice. Police and
prosecutors who know that convictions are hard to get will gather
more evidence and prepare more thoroughly; this will result in more
consistent vindication of innocent suspects and defendants because the
officials will discover more exculpatory evidence and better understand ambiguities and weaknesses in superficially strong cases. 14
As an argument for aggressive defense, this theory invites several
objections. First, we might ask why someone cynical about the dedication of public officials would expect them to respond to acquittals
due to aggressive defense by raising their standards of practice. Might
not they simply slack off, rationalizing their failures on the excuse that
the courts are not cooperating? Or perhaps they might increase their
efforts along less constructive lines than those contemplated by the
argument, spending more time on misleading and coercive tactics of
their own. 15 Or perhaps they might try to get the legislature to compensate for the increased difficulty of conviction by increasing the severity of punishment, giving them more plea bargaining leverage.
Indeed, the recent history of demagoguery around crime control
issues - pervasive efforts across the political spectrum to rally public
support for vindictive, ineffectual punitive measures by exploiting fears
13. John Kaplan, Defending Guilty People, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 223, 231-32 (1986).
14. The point is elaborated in John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the CriminalDefense Attorney
New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1980).
15. One apparently widespread police and prosecutorial response to strict federal court decisions on search-and-seizure issues has been police perjury designed to circumvent the decisions.
See, eg., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 75, 83 (1992).
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of criminal violence - suggests that the argument might be turned
around to assert that reliable convictions of guilty defendants are a
critical safeguard of innocent ones. In a world where aggressive defense is legitimate, acquittal is less a signal of probable innocence than
it would be in a world without aggressive defense. In the aggressive
defense world, acquittal is more likely to seem a consequence of defense delay, deception, or intimidation; this may be more demoralizing
to officials and the public and might adversely affect the quality of
official performance and exacerbate the vindictive irrationality of voter
behavior.
Second, the argument seems to assume that any increased requirements of proof for the prosecution are desirable. But the kind of defense involved here increases the costs of prosecution. There will
always be some point at which the social benefits of increased
prosecutorial burdens do not warrant the increased costs. Someone
has to make a judgment on behalf of society as to where the balance
should be struck. A defense lawyer committed to aggressive defense
refuses to make such a judgment, and he impairs the ability of the
judge or jury to do so.
In order to appraise the conduct of counsel in Kaplan's story, we
need to know something he does not tell us: Did defense counsel mislead the court? If counsel simply argued that the court should acquit
because the police's practices were inadequate, he did nothing questionable, but neither did he engage in aggressive defense. On the other
hand, if counsel suggested to the jury that the defendant had not made
the solicitation, knowing that he had, then counsel made no contribution to an informed decision about police practices.
Third, the argument seems to assume that society invariably responds to the increased burdens aggressive defense puts on the prosecution by augmenting prosecutorial resources. This seems unlikely.
Such resources are scarce, and prosecutorial tasks compete with many
other social needs for them. At some point increased prosecutorial
burdens are sure to press against resource constraints on expansion.
At the margin, the critical effect of aggressive defense is to force a
reallocation of resources among cases. This reallocation seems likely
to harm innocent defendants.
Ideally, aside from protecting intrinsic procedural rights, one
would want to focus prosecutorial resources on resolving doubts
about the guilt of suspects or defendants. But aggressive defense
forces prosecutors to reallocate resources to cases in which neither
they nor the defense lawyers have any doubts about guilt. Similarly,
aggressive defense requires prosecutors to clarify issues that make no
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contribution to the reliable determination of guilt. To the extent that
the total amount of resources is fixed, this means that fewer resources
are available for cases and issues that involve doubts about guilt. This
harms innocent defendants.
B. Dignity
A frequent concomitant of the idea that aggressive defense checks
the rapacity of the state is the idea that it expresses respect for the
"dignity of the individual." 16 One might distingish two ways of showing respect for individual dignity. One can show respect in a general
way for an individual regardlessof who he is or what he has done, and
one can show respect in a particular way for an individual because of
who he is or what he has done.
In the criminal process, we show respect in the general way by
extending rights independent of an individual's guilt and innocence for example, rights to notice of charges and to freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment. Defense counsel respects the dignity of the client
by helping enforce such rights as well as by observing the general civilities of polite intercourse with the client. It is not plausible, however,
to suggest that this general sense of dignity embraces strategic delay,
deception, and intimidation. Since this general notion of dignity applies regardless of the particular characteristics of the person, the client's general dignity rights have to be consistent with a comparable
measure of dignity for others. It seems implausible, even incoherent,
to think that everyone's dignitary interests require strategic delay, deception, and intimidation, and the dignitary argument alone provides
no reason why the dignity of criminal defendants requires a different
standard in these matters than that of others.
The more specific form of respect that differentiates among individuals because of who they are and what they have done seems incompatible with aggressive defense for two reasons. First, aggressive
defense treats all defendants alike; it tries to help the accused thwart
conviction regardless of whether or not they are guilty. Second, aggressive defense seeks to help many defendants present themselves as
something other than they are. This means not only that it portrays
defendants who have committed the acts with which they have been
charged as not having committed them; it also means that lawyers
typically dominate their clients' cases and orchestrate their clients' behavior in court not to express their own senses of themselves, but to
conform to the judge's and jury's stereotypes about how a respectable,
16. See, eg., FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 2.
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law-abiding citizen looks and behaves. Of course, if this is the best
way to get an acquittal, most defendants would prefer such a defense;
but few experience it as an affirmation of their individuality.
The idea that helping the accused escape substantively appropriate
punishment through aggressive defense serves individual dignity is
hard to square with the legitimacy of punishment after conviction. A
viable ideal of dignity has to make room for respect for the rights of
others and, at least in our system, for acceptance of punishment when
the individual violates such rights.
C.

Equal Opportunity

Defense lawyers often justify libertarian ethics as a way of equalizing the circumstances of rich and poor defendants. A poor defendant
should have as good a defense as a rich one, they say, and since a rich
defendant has the benefits of delay and deception, so should a poor
one. 17

The specious plausibility of this argument depends largely on its
conflation in the phrase "as good a defense" or as good an opportunity
to prove one's innocence (and to vindicate one's intrinsic procedural
rights) and the quite different notion of as good an opportunity to escape conviction.
Not all inequalities are illegitimate and, more importantly, not all
the illegitimate ones can be desirably mitigated by extending the advantages of the better-off to the rest. Rich people have much better
opportunities to murder others than the poor because they can buy
expensive weapons and hire skilled henchmen to help them. This,
however, is not an inequality that could desirably be corrected by extending the advantage to the poor. Whatever gain would result from
greater equality would be swamped by the loss represented by increased criminal violation of basic substantive rights of the victims.
The greater ability of the rich to escape conviction for their crimes
is morally comparable to their greater ability to commit them in the
first place. It is one of a large number of arbitrary determinants of
conviction. Among criminals, the dumb, the clumsy, and the neurotic
are more likely to be apprehended and convicted than the smart, the
swift, and the single-minded. These inequalities are injustices, but
they are trivial injustices compared to the injustices of many of the
crimes themselves, and remedying them would not be worth the costs.
Needless to say, this point does not apply to advantages the rich
enjoy over the poor in establishing their innocence. Moreover, we
17. I have often heard this argument in conversations with defense lawyers.
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should also distinguish between advantages the rich enjoy because of
social circumstances independent of the criminal justice process and
advantages created or enhanced by the criminal justice process. An
example of the latter would be the advantages created by official decisions to focus prosecutorial efforts disproportionately on poor defendants. I return to this point below.
D. Self-incrimination
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is an undeniably distinctive feature of the criminal process. It is not controversial
that, where this privilege applies and the defendant wishes to take advantage of it, the defense lawyer should assist him in doing so. How
the privilege should apply to a broad range of defense issues, however,
is ambiguous. Moreover, for many lawyers the privilege embodies a
general principle that should inform the defense lawyer's ethical decisionmaking, even where it is not specifically applicable as a constitutional, statutory, or common law mandate.
The importance of the privilege to the question of the distinctiveness of the defense lawyer's ethical obligations depends on how it relates to the right to counsel. On the one hand, we could interpret the
relation to mean only that the defendant is entitled to the assistance of
counsel in asserting his right to remain silent in the face of official
interrogation. At the other extreme, we could decide that the privilege
and the right to counsel require that the defendant not suffer any adverse consequences as a result of disclosures to counsel. This conclusion would require the lawyer to acquiesce in many forms of deception
and manipulation, for often the lawyer will know that a particular tactic is deceptive or manipulative only because of something the client
18
has told her.
Choosing from the positions along this spectrum requires some interpretation of what the privilege is about and, given the entrenched
position of the privilege in the legal culture, it is surprisingly difficult
to find a plausible one. 19 The privilege plays a prominent role in the
history of Anglo-American liberty, most notably in the struggle
against religious persecution in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in the struggle against political persecution in
America during the McCarthy era. In both periods, however, its pro18. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 30-31, presses this point.
19. The arguments for and against the privilege are surveyed in 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2250-84 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); David
Dolinko, Is There A Rationalefor the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv.
1063 (1986). Dolinko's excellent article argues that the privilege lacks a plausible justification.
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ponents associated the privilege with principles that now seem only
indirectly related to its contemporary core meaning. Among their
most basic concerns were the criminalization of belief and expression;
the claim that the defendant should not be forced to incriminate himself was usually linked to an explicit contention that the activity in
question could not be legitimately punished. Another set of concerns
was procedural; the privilege was used to support objections to "roving questioning," official interrogation without specified charges and
20
without supervision by independent judges.
The American legal system now deals with the former concerns
under the rubric of freedom of belief and expression; it deals with the
latter under the rubric of due process. These doctrines provide a variety of direct restraints on the criminalization of belief and a variety of
explicit requirements with regard to charging and judicial supervision
in the criminal process. To the extent these measures seem inadequate, the appropriate response is to strengthen them directly. The
practices we associate with the privilege seem a roundabout route to
these concerns.
To advance the inquiry, we have to ask what role the privilege has
to play in connection with activity that has been legitimately criminalized and in a procedure where there is fair notice, specification of
charges, and some preliminary judicial determination that the charges
have a minimal basis. Three defenses of the privilege are relevant to
this narrowed inquiry.
First, it is said that the privilege deters irresponsible prosecution.
Without it prosecutors might proceed to trial without adequate investigation in the hope that they could prove their case by examining the
defendant. This argument could be made just as well against the subpoena power. Limiting access to evidence at trial seems an inefficient
way to encourage more investigation. One would think this concern
would be adequately served by requiring the prosecutor to make a sufficient prima facie showing before examining the defendant.
Second, it is often asserted that forcing someone to "admit his
guilt" is an unjustifiable infringement on autonomy or liberty. This
suggestion is only plausible if "admit guilt" means concede that punishment is justified, rather than simply acknowledge conduct that the
law defines as criminal To preclude the defendant from disputing the
legitimacy of the proceeding or the punishment she faces would violate
important First Amendment values. But precisely for that reason we
do not need the privilege to protect against this danger. The real issue
20. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
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is whether asking the defendant to describe her conduct (to the same
extent that a third party witness could indisputably be asked about it)
violates the privilege.
Third, the privilege is sometimes associated with privacy values.
According to this argument, it is a violation of subjectivity to enlist a
person's knowledge against her for the purposes of punishment. But
let's face it: the entire criminal process is one massive invasion of privacy. (Murder is the most private act a person can commit, William
Faulkner suggested. 2 1) Compelled testimony about self-incriminating
conduct seems a far less serious inroad on privacy than substantive
rules that make liability turn on subjective intent (even where intent is
established by third party testimony). For example, intent is often the
critical element of many fraud and embezzlement prosecutions; this
requires an investigation into the defendant's subjective motives in
which a broad range of his conduct and lifestyle is potentially relevant.
Yet, the defendant's privacy has rarely been treated as a serious objec22
tion to substantive rules of this kind.
Thus, it is very hard to derive any general support from the privilege for aggressive advocacy beyond the specific confines in which it is
historically rooted.
E. Burden of Proof
I conceded earlier that it is proper for a defense attorney to seek an
acquittal for a substantively guilty client on the ground that the prosecution has failed to meet the burden of proof. Some defense lawyers
view this concession as a slippery slope leading to active deception. In
practice, there are difficulties in maintaining the line between arguing
that the burden of proof has not been met and actively deceiving.
The case of Norman and the borrowed Pontiac is a good example.
The defense lawyer argued that "obviously Steve and Norman had no
idea that the property was stolen, else why would they have been loading it into the Pontiac's back seat, instead of concealing it in the
trunk?" 23 In fact, the lawyer knew that the reason they had not
21. WILLIAM FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DusT 57 (1948).

22. George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosisof Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1976).
Another argument occasionally advanced for the privilege is that to require someone to give
evidence that would tend to bring about his own punishment is unconscionably cruel. As David
Dolinko has pointed out, this claim is inconsistent with a variety of legal practices that impose
punishment on people for failing to make psychologically difficult but morally appropriate
choices. Dolinko, supra note 19, at 1090-1107. As Henry Friendly emphasized, it also seems
wildly inconsistent with popular morality, which insists on the virtue of taking responsibility for
one's wrongs. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 671, 680 (1968).
23. See KUNEN, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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loaded it in the trunk was that they did not have the trunk key. This
sounds like deception. The lawyer at least strongly implied that they
could have opened the trunk, knowing that in fact they could not
have.
But many defense lawyers feel that this argument simply amounts
to pointing out an omission in the prosecution's case. It failed to produce evidence adequately negating the possibility that Norman could
have opened the trunk. Thus, any counterfactual argument can be
seen as a suggestion that the prosecution has failed to sustain its burden in negating the inference in question.
I think this goes too far. All the defense lawyers I know who press
this contention concede that the jury understands this sort of argument not just as a claim about the burden of proof, but as a suggestion
that the exculpating inference is true. Although ethics rules forbid
lawyers from asserting their "personal opinion[s]" about the matters
they argue to the jury, 24 lawyers often violate the prohibitions in form,
and many believe that lawyers must violate them, at least in spirit, to
be effective. As Monroe Freedman writes, "[e]ffective trial advocacy
requires that the attorney's every word, action, and attitude be consis' 25
tent with the conclusion that his client is innocent.
Thus, where the defense lawyer knows the inference is false, this
type of argument can only be regarded as deception. That does not
necessarily mean that it is unjustified, however. Defense lawyers feel
that jurors tend not to understand and to undervalue procedural
norms; they are naturally substance-oriented. If deception is the only
way to get the process to take account of burden-of-proof considerations, it is an ethical price worth paying.
The problem with this argument is that misleading juries is not the
only way to implement burden-of-proof concerns. When we distrust
the jury with an issue, we commonly give it to the judge. Indeed, the
judge now has responsibility to dismiss charges on motion of the defense where the prosecution fails to produce evidence from which the
jury could reasonably infer guilt. 26
Why isn't this practice adequate to address burden-of-proof concerns without deceptive argument? There are three relevant concerns.
One is the privilege against self-incrimination, which is partly implemented by placing the burden of proof (the burden-of-going-forward
24. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e) (1992).

25. Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (1966).
26. 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 461 (2d
ed. 1982).
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dimension) on the prosecution, but which I argued above does not
require aggressive defense. 2 7 Another concern served by the burden of
proof (the burden-of-persuasion dimension) is to institutionalize a social judgment about the relative harms of erroneous acquittal and erroneous conviction by encouraging the resolution of doubts in favor of
acquittal. But aggressive advocacy makes only the most indirect and
overbroad contribution here. It decreases the likelihood of erroneous
conviction only by decreasing the likelihood of any conviction. Licensing fraudulent evidence would have the same effect, though nearly
everyone concedes that this would be improper (excluding the controversial case of client perjury). As I argued above, 28 the idea that aggressive advocacy protects the innocent through its long run effects on
standards of police and prosecutorial practice seems mistaken.
Finally, putting the burden of proof (going forward) on the prosecution serves to discourage officials from subjecting citizens to the expense and anxiety of prosecution without adequate investigation or
consideration in the hope that the defendants' evidence will help them
complete their cases. But this concern seems adequately served by a
rule requiring the judge to dismiss if the prosecution fails to produce
evidence warranting conviction. As we saw above, 29 it is not obvious
that aggressive defense induces higher levels of preparation or, even if
it does, that the benefits of the additional preparation warrant its costs.
F. Disclosure to Counsel
Consider now the claim that, to the extent that we reject aggressive
defense, we endanger adequate representation by deterring full disclosure by clients to counsel. 30 Clients will withhold information if they
fear that it would cause their lawyers to forego strategically advantageous tactics. Because they will make mistakes in estimating what information would be harmful, they will sometimes withhold
information that would help establish legitimate defenses. Thus, the
argument goes, we must assure clients that nothing they say will cause
the lawyer to forego an advantageous tactic.
This argument covers a broad range of deceptive tactics in aggressive defense, since most commonly the lawyer is aware of the deception because of something the client has told him. The argument is
not limited to the criminal sphere, but it may have special weight there
27.
28.
29.
30.

See supra notes 18-22
See supra notes 13-15
See supra notes 13-15
See, eg., FREEDMAN,

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
supra note 3, at 30.
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because of the relatively high stakes for the criminal defendant and
because the argument resonates with the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.
It is tempting to respond that, if the defendant loses a legitimate
defense because he mistakenly withholds exculpatory information,
that is the penalty he pays for dishonesty. This is too glib, however.
There is no reason to think that the penalty will be proportionate to
the offense. For some defendants, dishonesty may be an understandable and forgivable response to a lawyer who appears to be an integral
part of a system that has abused and betrayed them in the past.
The key issue, then, is the practical extent to which the inhibition
of disclosure by the repudiation of aggressive defense would cause the
loss of valid defenses. This is an empirical question about which we
have only anecdotal information and which could probably never be
settled in any definite or systematic manner. Nevertheless, my intuition is that the costs of repudiation are not great.
The client disclosure argument assumes that the client cannot understand the substantive rules that determine what information would
be helpful to her at trial but that she can understand the confidentiality rules that determine what she can safely disclose to counsel. To the
contrary, I would expect that in most cases the lawyer can educate the
client about the substantive rules, but that in cases where she fails to
do so, she will also fail to make the client understand the confidentiality rules.
If the client is sophisticated and trusting, the lawyer should be able
to help her understand what information would be helpful. The elements of most crimes can be defined with some succinctness; the
charging papers will narrow the relevant factual circumstances, and
there are a limited number of affirmative defenses. 3 1 In fact, many
criminal defense lawyers try to formulate their defense strategies
before they question their clients in detail about relevant facts because
they do not want to know facts that would not be helpful and would
constrain aggressive advocacy. They typically do not ask the client,
"What happened?" but instead pose narrow questions tailored to surfacing information responsive to the prosecution's charges. 32
This practice is ethically unattractive, but the accounts do not sug31. People often worry that informing clients of their legal interests before they commit
themselves to their stories gives too much temptation to perjury. The objection ignores that even
honest clients often will not know what information is relevant until they know the legal standards and, more to the point here, the perjury risk seems a small price to pay to obviate the need
for aggressive defense as an inducement to candor.
32. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 104-11 (1985).
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gest that lawyers miss a lot of exculpatory information because of it.
Thus, lawyers appear to be able to infer the relevant defenses without
the client's full story and, if they can do that, they should be able to
educate clients about their interests sufficiently to induce them to disclose exculpatory information.
Of course, some clients will still withhold information the lawyer
has indicated would be helpful because they do not trust or understand the lawyer. But strong confidentiality guarantees and assurances of aggressive defense would improve this situation only if the
client understood the confidentiality and advocacy rules. Perhaps the
clearest finding of empirical research on the confidentiality rules is
that clients do not understand them. Many clients think that the rules
protect information absolutely that in fact may sometimes be disclosed, and they believe other categories of information are subject to
disclosure that are in fact protected. 33 Moreover, defense lawyers, especially for unsophisticated clients, often report that their clients hold
back information because they distrust the lawyers. 34 Thus, for all we
know, most of the problem of inadequate client-lawyer disclosure
would remain regardlessof what the rules on confidentiality and advocacy are.
G.

Punishment

Some people find the criminal process categorically different from
the civil one because the former is concerned with punishment rather
than compensation. When a civil litigant prevails despite the merits of
the case, the result is typically injustice to another particular citizen.
When a criminal defendant prevails despite the merits, the cost is
more abstract and diffuse. The victim of the injustice is society at
large. Moreover, the nature of the cost is harder to define. Given
widespread uncertainty about the legitimacy and efficacy of punishment, one might believe that we should have a high tolerance for the
costs of wrongful acquittal. 35
As I will soon acknowledge in detail, I think there is some substance to this point, but it fails as a categorical rationale for aggressive
defense. First, arguably this point has already been taken into account
in defining the substantive terms of punishment and certain procedural
33. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 377-96 (1989).
34. MANN, supra note 32, at 40-42; see also JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 105 (1972) (stating that only 20.4% of defendants
responding to a survey felt their public defender was on their side).
35. See, eg., Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 12.
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protections of the accused, such as the right to counsel and the high
burden of proof in criminal cases.
Second, this argument overlooks the fact that the criminal process
is often a substitute for the civil process. In cases where defendant and
victim are in continuing contact, the criminal process is often used to
deter specifically wrongs that are in principle civilly actionable but for
which either the civil process is too expensive or the civil remedies
inadequate. In addition, some criminal processes involve victim restitution remedies that are indistinguishable from civil remedies except in
their relative ease of enforcement.
H. Interim Conclusion
The arguments commonly made for the propriety of aggressive defense in the criminal sphere fail plausibly to distinguish criminal from
civil practice or to provide a tenable rationale for aggressive defense.
The conclusion suggested by the argument so far is that aggressive
defense should be, at least prima facie, condemned.
II.

SOCIAL

WORK, JUSTICE, AND NULLIFICATION

We have yet to consider a rationale that is not prominent in the
rhetorical arsenal of the proponents of aggressive defense but in fact
seems to reflect an important ethical motivation of many defense lawyers. Barbara Babcock calls it the "social worker's reason," and she
illustrates it with a story about how she used a strained insanity defense to save an indigent black client from a mandatory twenty-year
36
prison sentence for possession of heroin.
The "social worker's reason" focuses on the harshness of contemporary punishment practices and on the disproportionate incidence of
harsh punishment of racial minorities and the poor. The practices in
question seem both pervasive and intensifying. A few years ago Texas
sentenced a man convicted of three frauds involving a total of about
$200 to life imprisonment.3 7 In California a young three-time loser
who had never been charged with a violent crime recently received life
38
without possibility of parole for possession of 5.5 grams of crack.
These are not idiosyncratic instances, but examples of an enormous
class of insanely harsh sentences, many of them prompted by public
and official hysteria over the drug problem fueled by demagogic poli36. Babcock, supra note 6, at 178-79.
37. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (rejecting the claim that the punishment was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual).

38.
(1990).

MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN Los ANGELES

288
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tics. The United States now has a larger fraction of its population
locked up than any country in the world: in the 1970s and 1980s its
incarceration rates exceeded those of nearly all totalitarian states. 39
The fact that such punishment is disproportionately visited on racial minorities and poor people is surely an important part of the reason why these practices are politically supported. Nearly a quarter of
all black men in America aged twenty to twenty-nine are locked up or
on probation or parole. 4° Moreover, in some jurisdictions the punishment practices are an integral part of a system of policing that targets
minority communities and people of color, especially young men, for
intensive and often abusive surveillance, designed in part to keep them
out of areas used by privileged racial and economic groups and in part
to reinforce their subservience to a local power structure that excludes
them. 4 1 Of course, this characterization of contemporary criminal law
enforcement is controversial, and one who doubts it will not find much
support for aggressive defense in it. However, because many people
(including me) believe it is accurate, it is worth assessing what support
this characterization would provide, if it were true, for aggressive
defense.
Consider first that Babcock calls the argument in question "the
social worker's reason." At first glance, this seems an odd way to
characterize an argument about legal ethics. It refers to a different
profession. Moreover, it eschews rhetoric that is associated with the
legal profession and seems appropriate here, notably "injustice." Babcock's formulation reflects the fact that the argument is in tension with
the positivist strains of the legal culture.
For the most part, the practices in question involve the imposition
of statutorily prescribed penalties and the exercise of statutorily conferred official discretion. Moreover, doctrine has long closed off the
principal routes to constitutional review of these practices. It all but
precludes review of the fairness or proportionality of punishment
under the Due Process or Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses,4 2
and it permits relief under the Equal Protection Clause for abuse of
prosecutorial discretion only in rare and extreme circumstances.4 3
39. ELLIOTr CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME 28 (1985); Fox Butterfield, U.S. Expands the
Lead in Rate of Imprisonment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992, at A16.
40. Butterfield, supra note 39.
41. See, for example, the chilling portrait of the Daryl Gates regime in Los Angeles in
DAVIS, supra note 38, at 267-322.
42. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (discussing Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).
43. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
665-70 (4th ed. 1992).
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This was true even throughout the period in which the federal courts
opened wide avenues for review of police interrogation and searchand-seizure practices.
Especially in the absence of any ample constitutional footholds, it
is hard for lawyers to find direct support within their own professional
culture for efforts that are in essence designed to subvert the practices
of excessive and discriminatory punishment. Since the legislature has
mandated or authorized the punishments and conferred discretion on
police, prosecutors, and judges, the punishments have sovereign authorization and hence legal legitimacy. Thus, lawyers motivated by
opposition to harsh and discriminatory punishment find themselves
reaching for justifications for their work in procedural concerns or
nonlegal rhetoric.
In doing so, however, they ignore important nonpositivist strains
of the legal culture; these strains might be called the substantivejustice
strains. From the substantive justice perspective, the fact that the legislature has authorized, and the courts have refused to condemn or
provide remedies for, the practices in question does not conclude the
issue of their legal legitimacy. There may still be room for a legal
actor to conclude that the legislatures and courts are wrong - that
they have misapplied the relevant legal norms in approving these practices - and then to proceed on the basis of what the actor believes
would be the correct decisions to the extent she is able to do so.
There is a precarious but long-standing tradition in American law
that legitimates some measure of this type of activity under the rubric
of nullification. The idea of nullification is that in some circumstances
legal actors should have the power to subvert the enforcement of presumptively authoritative legal - typically statutory - norms. Nullification is not a license for whim, but a partial decentralization of legal
authority. The nullifying judgment is a legal judgment, not a subjective one; it considers the particular norm in question against the more
general and basic norms of the legal culture. Nullification is often defended as an extraordinary function that safeguards against the breakdown or abuse of routine processes of government. The nullification
power is uncontroversially extended to judges in matters of constitutional review and, more controversially, in nonconstitutional statutory
cases. It is readily associated with juries, which are empowered to
acquit even in the face of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a criminal violation, and prosecutors, who are expected to forego prosecution
of many offenses on which they could win conviction. 44
44. On jury nullification, see MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION
TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 45-66 (1973); Mark D.
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I have argued elsewhere that some lawyer conduct that subverts
substantive legal norms might be understood and accepted as a desirable form of nullification. 4 5 I think that an argument based on the idea
of nullification would provide better support for aggressive defense
than the arguments commonly made for it. Aggressive defense is justified where it subverts punishment that, although formally prescribed,
is unjustly harsh and discriminatory in terms of the more general
norms of the legal culture. The practice is further supported to the
extent that such unjust punishment seems to be a function of various
political breakdowns, including the political disenfranchisement of the
poor and demagogic obfuscation in the electoral process.
However, even if one concedes the view of contemporary criminal
prosecution on which this argument is premised, it is inadequate as a
justification for the current practice of aggressive defense. The problem is that the argument is underinclusive as long as one concedes that
there is any substantial class of defendants for whom punishment
would be just and otherwise appropriate. Aggressive defense is a practice of categorical or wholesale nullification; it does not focus on subverting only the prosecutorial and police practices that could plausibly
be opposed as excessive and unjust.
Thus, for the "social worker's" or nullification argument to work,
the practice of aggressive defense would have to be reformulated toward one of ad hoe or retail nullification. Aggressive defense should
be limited to cases that present a threat of excessive or arbitrary punishment and only employed to the extent it is likely to counter that
threat. The practice of aggressive defense ought to be part of a larger
strategy designed to focus resources and effort on cases that present
the greatest threats of injustice.
The practical ability of a lawyer to adopt this approach will vary
with the degree of autonomy she has in her practice. Some lawyers
will find it easier to continue to commit themselves categorically to
aggressive defense but to apply selective criteria at the point they decide to take on clients, restricting their practice to clients threatened
by excessive or discriminatory punishment. Other lawyers will have
more discretion about how they handle cases than about which cases
to take. Lawyers in offices that regulate ethical issues through institutional standards may be able to persuade their offices to adopt the apHowe, Juries as Judges of the CriminalLaw, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939). On prosecutorial
nullification, see KADISH & KADISH, supra, at 80-85; SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 43, at
1115-18. On nonconstitutional judicial nullification, see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).

45. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1113-19
(1988).
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proach and specify criteria for it institutionally. Others may be unable
to influence their office policies toward the approach but may retain a
good deal of discretion over their own cases.
It is probably better for lawyers to formulate criteria for ad hoe
nullification collectively and publicly - through public defender programs or specialized bar associations. Such criteria should take the
form of general standards, not ad hoe institutional management of individual cases. But if public formulation of criteria is not practical, it
is better to have criteria formulated and applied individually and in
private than no criteria at all.
To varying degrees, defense lawyers are subject to pressures from
bar associations and courts that regulate their practices, from referral
and funding sources, and from clients. Some lawyers may have
enough autonomy in these relations to adopt the ad hoc nullification
approach publicly and to link it to public opposition to excessive and
discriminatory punishment, perhaps allying themselves with alternative bar associations and nonlawyer groups seeking to reform the system. Other lawyers will lack the autonomy to adopt the approach
publicly but will have enough discretion over their cases to apply the
approach tacitly. The more practical discretion the lawyer has, the
more ambitiously she can apply the approach, but very few lawyers
could not meaningfully apply it at all.
Of course, some people will question whether there are any plausible criteria by which lawyers could distinguish excessive and discriminatory punishment, but the "social worker's" argument presupposes
such criteria, so anyone who subscribes to this argument should have
some. Moreover, while legal doctrine on sentencing and discrimination does not specifically legitimate the lawyer decisionmaking proposed here, it provides ample illustration of how lawyers disposed to
make judgments of proportionality and discrimination might do so in
a structured way grounded in norms of substantial social acceptance.
Particular lawyer nullification judgments will be controversial, but
that is not, in itself, an objection to the practice. Particular judgments
of police about when to arrest, prosecutors about when to prosecute,
and judges and juries about when to convict are controversial as well.
In deciding whether to favor giving responsibility to role players, we
do not ask whether each decision they make will meet with universal
agreement, but whether on the whole their decisions will make a positive contribution in terms of the values we believe are relevant.
We cannot answer the question whether the widespread, open
adoption of ad hoc nullification would improve the criminal justice
system without committing ourselves to some criteria for evaluating
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the system and making some predictions about what criteria defense
lawyers would adopt and apply. But I think anyone who subscribes to
the critique of the present system as systemically prone to excessive
and discriminatory punishment should be optimistic about the potential of this approach. My guess is that most idealistic defense lawyers
subscribe to this critique. The ad hoe nullification approach would
allow them to express it more directly in their practice. It could improve practice both by leading to advocacy decisions that better fit the
values most plausibly invoked to justify aggressive defense and by diminishing many defense lawyers' sense of alienation in their day-today practice from their basic normative commitments.
Because criteria will necessarily differ within the defense bar, some
people will be concerned that clients will get different levels of defense
depending on with which lawyer they end up. However, that situation
already exists under the current regime, for we defined aggressive defense to encompass tactics that were not explicitly regulated. Moreover, this seems to be an instance in which concerns of horizontal
equity are less weighty than concerns of substantive justice.
One standard liberal response to the legitimacy of this kind of decisionaking by lawyers is the community-controlled legal services office. It is curious that the idea of community control has not been
extended as often or as enthusiastically to public defender programs.
There are serious problems with the community control ideal: for example, there is no self-evident way to define and represent communities, and fairness requires that lawyers have freedom from some forms
of political interference while representing clients. But rational deployment of defense resources requires many fairness and humaneness
judgments about police and prosecutorial practices, as well as about
the relative social harm and iniquity of different offenses. Such judgments are best made by a body generally representative of a meaningfully defined local group. There are plenty of precedents and examples
in the civil sphere and, while the record is mixed, the idea retains
46
promise.
Some may object that the open adoption of ad hoc nullification
would make defenders vulnerable by appearing to politicize their practice. Ad hoc nullification might simultaneously enrage the forces of
crime control demagoguery and alienate libertarian liberals whose
support for aggressive criminal defense rests on the fallacious but ideologically powerful views criticized in Part II. Yet, a substantive cri46. See, eg., JEFFREY BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 97 (1993); cf
45 C.F.R. § 1607.3(e) (1992) (boards of federally supported civil legal aid programs to include
members designated by neighborhood and community groups).
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tique of excessive and discriminatory punishment might provide a
more powerful ideological basis for opposing crime control demagoguery than libertarian liberalism. Especially outside the bar, the ideological appeal of libertarian liberalism has waned, and indeed crime
control demagoguery seems to have profited from popular revulsion at
its apparent antinomian contempt for responsibility and punishment,
its paranoid antistatism, its indifference to victims, and its obsession
with procedural at the expense of substantive justice. Many people
concerned about crime control would be far more receptive to appeals
for support for criminal defense based on ideals of substantive humaneness and fairness than they would to appeals based on the preoccupations of libertarian liberalism.
CONCLUSION

We began with the question of whether criminal defense should be
treated differently for the purposes of the critique of the standard conception of adversary advocacy. The reasons most commonly offered
for such a distinction turn out to be implausible. Nevertheless, there
are reasons that might justify the selective use in criminal defense of
the tactics of aggressive defense, as opposed to the categorical use entailed by the standard conception. The selective or ad hoe approach is
one advanced for the civil sphere by some of the critics of the standard
conception;4 7 thus, if you buy their argument, the criminal sphere is
not different at the level of general approach. Nevertheless, the selective approach I have suggested looks to the particular context of practice; the problem of excessive and discriminatory punishment is
distinctive to the criminal sphere. In that sense, criminal defense is in
fact different.

47. See Luban, supra note 9, at 1018-21; Rhode, supra note 1, at 638-47; Simon, supra note

